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procedural statutes in conflict with it. This is clearly demonstrated by
the cases dealing with rules governing appellate practice. Recent indica-
tions that the rule-making power may be of less force in the area of trial
court rules, do not appear to have been reflected in actual litigation. It
has been forcefully argued that procedural statutes exist solely by grace
of judicial comity. 2 No Indiana case has been found in which the court
stated its position so strongly. The courts have, however, consistently
asserted their superiority in the field of procedure when legislative enact-
ments conflict with rules of court.
THE UNIFORM TRAFFIC TICKET v. INDIANA CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: CONFLICT OR COMPATABILITY?
A procedural device new to Indiana traffic law enforcement has re-
cently been introduced in this state. It will be interesting to note the
progress of the uniform traffic ticket and complaint' which has been
adopted by several Hoosier police departments2 as a result of the progres-
sive influence of the American Bar Association's Traffic Court pro-
gram.' Will this multi-purposed vehicle withstand the test of Indiana's
rigid criminal procedure requirements, or will it fall by the wayside as
an unsuccessful experiment? The answer to this question would seem
to depend on the ability of the uniform traffic ticket to perform the func-
tions for which it is designed under the requirements of the Indiana law,4
62. See note 14 supra.
1. For a composite descripiton of the ticket, its purpose, and mechanics of its
use, see: ECONOMOS, UNIFORm TRAFFIC TICKET AND COMPLAINT AND MODEL RULES
GOVERNING PROCEDURE IN TRAFFIC CASES (1958), a pamphlet prepared by the Ameri-
can Bar Association Traffic Court Program and published by Weger Governmental
Systems, 117 Shiawassee St., Lansing, Michigan.
2. Among the Indiana cities which use a form of uniform traffic ticket and
complaint are Evansville, Goshen, and West Lafayette. The Indiana State Police
Department adopted the uniform traffic ticket and complaint on January 1, 1959.
3. Stressing the educational advantages of printing the leading causes of traffic
accidents on the face of the uniform ticket, the American Bar Association Traffic
Court Program has recommended a form of the ticket which is now used by over
eleven hundred cities. It has also been recommended by the Action Program of the
President's Highway Safety Conference, a Conference of Chief Justices, a Gover-
nor's Conference, a Public Official's Safety Conference, and by the National Sheriffs'
Association. See EcoNoMos, op cit. supra note 1, at inside front cover. See also
Economos, The Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint - A Judicial Function, 1958
Wis L. REv. 189.
4. Briefly, the functions which the uniform traffic ticket is designed to perform
are: (1) police notice or citation (2) police arrest record (3) traffic court docket
(4) abstract of court record for state licensing authority and (5) criminal com-
plaint or affidavit. The ticket is also designed to facilitate strict accountability,
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or, stated otherwise, the question becomes one of whether or not the
Indiana law is flexible enough to absorb this new "one package" ap-
proach to traffic law enforcement.
THE UNIFORi TICKET AS A NOTICE TO APPEAR
Three methods are commonly used by American police officers to
obtain the presence of traffic violators in court. These methods are by
ticket, summons, and summary arrest.' In a recent Ohio case the court
held that a traffic ticket purporting to be a summons must be tested by
the statutory requirements of a summons, and failure to meet these re-
quirements resulted in abuse of process.' Violators of Indiana's motor
vehicle code are arrested,' but residents of the state may secure immediate
release from custody except for certain serious offenses' by giving their
written promise to appear in court at a later date." The uniform traffic
ticket, among other things, is designed to serve as a notice to appear
thereby eliminating ticket "fixing," and its versatile design also aids the traffic
court judge in reaching.a penalty commensurate with the seriousness of the violation
committed. EcoNomos, op. cit. supra note 1, at 18, 20.
5. WARREN, TRAFFIC COURTS 35 (1942).
6. State v. Wheeler, 80 Abs 114, 157 N.E.2d 763 (1958).
7. Ibid. The court recognized that the ticket issued by the police officer was
only a "citation," but held that because it purported to be a summons it was abuse of
process when the ticket, labeled a "summons," directed the violator to appear and
stand trial at a certain time and place when the officer issuing the ticket knew that
only arraignment would be possible. The court indicated that even though the pro-
cedure used by the officer was, in a sense, extra-legal, and although technically the
ticket issued was not a summons, still the citation should have complied with the
statutory requirements for a summons by setting forth substantially the nature of
the offense, because in practical, if not legal effect the citation serves as a summons
as the overwhelming majority of those accused of traffic violations voluntarily comply
by appearing in court.
8. IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2308 (Burns 1952).
9. IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2307 (Burns 1952). The statute requires immediate
appearance before a magistrate upon arrest for the offense of reckless homicide,
driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs, and failure
to stop after an accident. Immediate appearance is also required when the person
arrested demands it, when the charge is a motor vehicle offense causing or con-
tributing to an accident resulting in injury or death of any person, and when a resident
of Indiana refuses to give his written promise to appear in court upon being arrested
for a violation of the motor vehicle act not otherwise requiring immediate appearance
before a magistrate. In McClanahan v. State, 232 Ind. 567, 112 N.E.2d 575 (1953),
the Supreme Court of Indiana indicated that it did not believe that the legislature
intended for a person who was in fact intoxicated to be taken immediately before
a magistrate because such a person is incapable of pleading to the charge against
him freely and understandingly. The court further construed an "immediate" appear-
ance as meaning an appearance during the usual hours for conducting court, hinting
that any statute which required the courts to conduct business twenty-four hours
every day would be unconstitutional.
10. IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2308 (Burns 1952). The legislature did not intend
that a resident drunken driver should be released on his written promise to appear
later in court. McClanahan v. State, 233 Ind. 317, 117 N.E.2d 749 (1953).
NOTES
ticket." Tested against the statutory requirements," the uniform ticket
seems to be adequate as a notice to appear.
THE UNIFORM TICKET AS A POLICE ARREST RECORD
As an arrest record for the police, the uniform ticket serves its pur-
pose well. Aside from certain required information which must appear
in the notice to appear ticket," the statutes do not prescribe the form of
traffic arrest records for the police. The third copy of the uniform
ticket, which serves as the police arrest record, contains all the informa-
tion normally recorded in such records. 4 There seems to be no problem
in this area.
THE UNIFORm TICKET AS A DOCKET
The reverse side of the complaint copy of the uniform ticket is de-
signed to serve as the traffic court docket." Extensive review of the
requirements of dockets of all courts having jurisdiction over motor ve-
hicle offenses" is beyond the scope of this article, however, it seems rea-
11. See app. A. To conform with Indiana terminology the word "summons"
should be replaced with the words "notice to appear."
12. ". . . the arresting officer shall prepare in duplicate written notice to
appear in court containing the name and address of such person, the license number
of his vehicle, if any, and the offense charged, and the time when and the place
where such person shall appear in court." IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2308(a) (Bums
1952). "In every charge of violation of any speed regulation in this act, the complaint
or affidavit, and the summons, warrant or notice to appear, shall specify the speed at
which the defendant is alleged to have driven, and the prima facie or fixed speed
applicable within the district or at the location." IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2009(a)
(Burns 1952).
13. Ibid.
14. See app. A. IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-448 (Burns 1952) provides the content
of a report of arrest which is to be forwarded to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
by police agencies following arrest for the violation of the state traffic code or for
violations of city traffic ordinances. ". . . such report shall state the offense with
which such operator or driver is charged, the court in which pending and the names
of all available witnesses to such violation, the name and address of such operator
and in the event such operator is the holder of a license issued under the provisions
of this act, the kind of license and license number, together with the license plate
number upon the vehicle so operated by such operator and if any such officer shall
fail to make the report provided for in this section, he shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor." In actual practice, this statute is not followed, the Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles keeping for record only the abstract of conviction provided for by IND.
ANN. STAT. § 47-2311 (Burns 1952). Because a copy of the arrest ticket is included
on the back of the abstract of conviction, the use of the uniform traffic ticket
would allow compliance with both statutes herein discussed if the arresting officer
would note on the arrest ticket, the names of all witnesses to the violation.
15. Ibid.
16. Seven different courts hear motor vehicle offense cases in Indiana. They
are: circuit courts, superior courts, justice of the peace courts, magistrate courts,
city courts, municipal courts and criminal courts. In 3rd, 4th, and 5th class cities
the mayor, under certain circumstances, may act as city judge. IND. ANN. STAT. §§
4-2401, 4-2613 (Burns 1946). Minor traffic offenses may also be heard by a "traffic
violations bureau," created by ordinance in larger cities.
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sonable that uniform docket requirements for traffic offenses, applicable
to all courts having traffic jurisdiction,"7 should be considered in any
future program of traffic court reform. Such uniform requirements
could be established by supreme court rule.'"
THE UNIFORI TICKET AS AN ABSTRACT OF COURT RECORD FOR
THE STATE LICENSING AUTHORITY
Every Indiana court hearing motor vehicle violation cases is re-
quired to forward an abstract of conviction or forfeiture to bail to the
bureau of motor vehicles within ten days after the conviction or forfei-
ture. 9 The same action is required upon the conviction of any person
for manslaughter or any felony in the commission of which a motor ve-
hicle was used."° The uniform ticket-abstract provides spaces for all of
the information required by the statute to be forwarded to the bureau.2'
It should be noted, however, that the statute requires the abstract to be
made on a form furnished by the bureau of motor vehicles. It is the
practice in Indiana for each police department to furnish its own traffic
tickets. Therefore, courts using the uniform ticket-abstract furnished by
police departments would seem to be in technical violation of the statu-
tory requirement that the abstract be furnished by the bureau of motor
vehicles." It would seem that this technical violation would not affect
the validity of a conviction, however, as the requirement is an administra-
tive one incidental to the conviction or forfeiture.
THE UNIFORM TICKET AS A COMPLAINT OR AFFIDAVIT
The original, or first sheet of the uniform ticket is designed to serve
as the complaint, or affidavit.2 The penal provisions of the Indiana
17. Ibid.
18. IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-109 (Burns 1946). "While this statute grants the
court the power to frame rules, it is quite clear on principle, as well as upon authority,
that the court had such power without the statute. This court is a constitutional
court, and as such received its essential and inherent powers, rights and jurisdiction
from the Constitution, and not from the legislature, and it has power to prescribe
rules for its own direct government independent of legislative enactment." Epstein
v. State, 190 Ind. 693, 696, 128 N.E. 353 (1921).
19. IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2311 (Burns 1952).
20. Ibid.
21. "Said abstract must be made upon a form furnished by the bureau and
shall include the name and address of the party charged, the number, if any, of his
operator's or chauffeur's license, the registration number of the vehicle involved, the
nature of the offense, the date of hearing, the plea, the judgment, or whether bail
forfeited and the amount of the fine or forfeiture as the case may be." IND. ANN.
STAT. § 47-2311 (Burns 1952).
22. Ibid.
23. Any court or clerk who does not comply with the requirement of the
statute is made liable on his official bond. IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2311 (Burns 1952).
24. See app. A.
NOTES
motor vehicle regulations, as is true in most states, are criminal in charac-
ter and as such, all proceedings for their violation must be instituted by a
verified written accusation. This was true at common law, and it is true
in all the states today unless the contrary clearly appears via statute. 5
The right of a criminal defendant to have a written accusation placed
against him before trial is basic to the concepts of Anglo-American law,
and there is authority that it is one of the few rights which cannot be
waived.2"
At common law a valid criminal pleading by indictment met the re-
quirements of informing the defendant of the nature of the charge against
him. It also formed a record which set out the crime with such particu-
larity as to prevent a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, and it
established jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the of-
fense." A recent New York case involving the uniform traffic ticket
followed the common law rule that a plea of guilty does not waive the
jurisdictional defect raised by the lack of a verified criminal pleading.28
Methods of prosecution vary from state to state and Indiana's procedure
has been described as "unique"2 in that all criminal prosecutions, except
for murder and treason, 0 may be commenced in the circuit and criminal
courts by affidavit.2 ' Violations of motor vehicle regulations are usually
prosecuted by affidavit; therefore, if the uniform traffic ticket is to serve
as an affidavit in Indiana, it must meet the tests of a valid criminal
pleading.
The sufficiency of an affidavit must be tested by the Federal Consti-
tution, state constitution, statutes, and by the common law. The Indiana
Constitution guarantees the right of the accused to "demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof."
This has been construed to mean that the facts constituting the alleged
offense-the gist of the offense-shall be charged, in writing, in direct
25. 8 BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 5427 (1950).
26. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 204, 205 (1947).
27. Id. at 226, 227.
28. People v. Scott, 3 N.Y.2d 148, 143 N.E.2d 901 (1957).
29. ROBINSON, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 315 (1941).
30. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-908 (Burns 1956), Trisler v. State, 233 Ind. 479, 120
N.E.2d 404 (1954).
31. "The first pleading on the part of the state is either an indictment or
affidavit." IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1103 (Burns 1956). Article 7, § 17 of the Constitu-
tion of Indiana empowers the General Assembly to modify or abolish the grand
jury system.
32. IN . ANN. STAT. § 9-716 (Burns 1956); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 47-812, 47-
2009 (Burns 1952). See also 2 EWBANKS, INDIANA CRIMINAL LAW § 1385 (1956)
for form affidavits relative to offenses under the Indiana motor vehicle code.
33. IND. CONST. art. I, § 13.
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and unmistakable terms, 4 with sufficient certainty so as to fully apprise
the accused of the crime with which he is charged.3" The common law
is in force in Indiana except as it has been changed by the federal and
state constitutions and statutes.3" It seems that for the most part the con-
stitution and statutes are directed toward the common law safeguards,
and, except for the curtailment in the use of the common law indictment
and information 7 and their substantial replacement by the affidavit,
these guarantees remain intact in the criminal procedure of Indiana."6
Ordinarily, any person having knowledge of the facts and the ability
to make an oath may make an affidavit,6 but the same allegations are
required in an affidavit as would be necessary for a sufficient charge of
the same crime by indictment.4" The person making the affidavit may
charge the violation on his information and belief,4' but the charge must
34. Robinson v. State, 232 Ind. 396, 112 N.E.2d 861 (1953); Large v. State,
200 Ind. 430, 164 N.E. 263 (1928) ; Kimmel v. State, 198 Ind. 444, 154 N.E. 16 (1926).
35. "It is fundamental in criminal pleading that each material fact must be
charged with reasonable certainty as to time and place. The Bill of Rights in our
Constitution gives the accused the right 'to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof.' This provision of our Bill of
Rights arises from the English charters of liberty and from judicial decisions in
England prior to the adoption of our Constitution, and the language used in the
Bill of Rights had a meaning that had then been defined by the courts of England,
and one phase of it was, that as to each material allegation the accused might be
sufficiently informed to prepare his defense." Kain v. State, 234 Ind. 160, 163, 123
N.E.2d 177, 179 (1954).
36. IND. ANN. STAT. § 1-101 (Burns 1946).
37. "The procedure provided by §§ 2150 and 2151, Burns, etc., 1926 and 1929,
§§ 9-908 and 9-909, Burns, etc., 1933, §§ 2131, 2132, Baldwin's 1934, Acts 1905, ch.
169 §§ 118, 119, p. 584, Acts 1927, ch. 132, § 4, p. 411 which authorizes prosecutions
to be commenced in circuit and criminal courts by filing an affidavit bearing the
prosecuting attorney's signed endorsement of his approval is the statutory substitute
for an earlier procedure which authorized the commencement of prosecutions by
information supported by affidavit. While the early statute provided that the affi-
davit could be made by any person who 'has knowledge of the commission of any
offense' and was to be filed with the clerk or the prosecuting attorney, the informa-
tion was to be made and filed by the prosecuting attorney. The evident purpose of
the General Assembly in providing the present method of instituting a prosecution
by the filing of an approved affidavit was to relieve the prosecuting attorney of
the duty of preparing and filing an information. But in relieving him of that
necessity, the General Assembly imposed upon him the duty of examining, approving,
and in effect adopting as his own, the affidavit presented for filing, in order to
commence a prosecution." Lynn v. State 207 Ind. 393, 397, 193 N.E. 380, 382 (1934).
38. "The affidavit of indictment must show jurisdiction. It must also charge
the offense with sufficient certainty that it may be pleaded in bar of a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense; and further than this, with such certainty and
particularity as to time and place of material averments that the defendant may
prepare himself to meet the charge." Brockway v. State, 192 Ind. 656, 658, 138 N.E.
88, 89, (1922).
39. Alstott v. State, 205 Ind. 92, 185 N.E. 896 (1933).
40. State v. Boswell, 104 Ind. 541, 4 N.E. 675 (1885); ORFIELD, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 208 (1947).
41. Brooks v. State, 233 Ind. 391, 120 N.E.2d 182 (1954).
42. Cantwell v. State, 27 Ind. 505 (1867).
NOTES
be supported by oath or affirmation. 2 The sufficiency of an affidavit
may be tested to a limited extent by specific statutory standards.4"
The proponents of the uniform traffic ticket and complaint have
indicated that a legal and sufficient affidavit may be broken down into
nine essential elements." The following analysis will compare these nine
elements with the essential elements of a legal and sufficient criminal
complaint in Indiana.
1. COMMENCEMENT.
All criminal prosecutions must be in the name of and by the author-
ity of the state, and the style of all process is: "The State of Indiana.""
All affidavits must contain a title which should specify the name of the
court to which the document is presented and the names of the parties. 6
The title of the uniform complaint does not provide a space for the name
43. "The indictment or affidavit is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom:
First. That the indictment was found by the grand jury of the county, or the affi-
davit presented by the prosecuting attorney of the circuit in which the court was held.
Second. That the defendant is named or described, in an indictment, as a person
whose name is unknown to the grand jurors, or, in an affidavit, unknown to the
prosecuting witness.
Third. That an offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court, or is
triable therein.
Fourth. That the offense charged is clearly set forth in plain and concise
language, without unnecessary repetition, and,
Fifth. That the offense charged is stated with such a degree of certainty, that the
court may pronounce judgment upon a conviction according to the right of the
case." IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1126 (Burns 1956);
"No indictment or affidavit shall be deemed invalid, nor shall the same be set
aside or quashed, nor shall the trial, judgment or other proceeding, be stayed, arrested
or in any manner affected for any of the following defects:
First. For a mistake in the name of the court or county, in the title thereof.
Second. For the want of an allegation of the time or place of any material fact,
when the venue and time have once been stated in the indictment or affidavit.
Third. That dates and numbers are represented by figures.
Fourth. For an omission of any of the following allegations, viz.:
"With force and arms"; "contrary to the form of the statute"; or "against the
peace and dignity of the state of Indiana."
Fifth. For an omission to allege that the grand jurors were impaneled, sworn or
charged.
Sixth. For any surplusage or repugnant allegation, when there is sufficient matter
alleged to indicate the crime and person charged.
Seventh. For the omission of the words "as appears by the record."
Eighth. For omitting to state the time at which the offense was committed, in any
case in which time is not the essence of the offense.
Ninth. For omitting a statement of the value or price of any matter or thing or
the amount of damages or injury in any case where the value or price of the
amount of damages or injury is not of the essence of the offense.
Tenth. For any other defect or imperfection which does not tend to the prejudice
of the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits." IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1127
(Burns 1956).
44. EcoNoMos, op. cit. supra note 1, at 4.
45. IN . CONsT. art. 7, § 18, IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1101 (Burns 1956).
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of the defendant,4" but this technical defect is not fatal notwithstanding
the statutory requirement." The formal charge in the uniform complaint
commences in language similar to that commonly used in Indiana and it
appears to be sufficient.4"
2. NAME OF THE DEFENDANT.
The defendant must be named or referred to in the affidavit, either
in the caption or in the body or the affidavit will be clearly insufficient. 0
If the name of the defendant is unknown to the prosecuting witness, how-
ever, it is sufficient to refer to him by alleging that his name is un-
known." Not only is the name of the defendant included in the uniform
complaint, but his address, age, and a brief physical description is also
provided. 2 Therefore the uniform complaint identifies the accused with
more certainty than is required by the Indiana law.
3. DATE OF THE VIOLATION.
The date of the violation should be alleged but failure to state the
time of the occurrence of the offense will not render the affidavit bad
unless time is the essence of the offense. 9 The uniform complaint again
provides more information than would seem to be required in that it
states the day, month, year, and exact time of the offense. 4
4. UNLAWFUL OPERATION OF A MOTOR VEHICLE UPON A PUBLIC
HIGHWAY.
The allegation that the unlawful operation of the motor vehicle took
place upon a public highway is essential in the charging of most motor
46. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1104 (Burns 1956).
47. See app. A.
48. Failure of an affidavit to contain a title giving the names of the parties
and the name of the court is not cause for quashing the affidavit. Hall v. State,
178 Ind. 448, 99 N.E. 732 (1912).
49. The uniform ticket-complaint commences the statement of the charge with
the phrase, "The undersigned, being duly sworn, upon his oath deposes and says:".
If properly subscribed and sworn to at the bottom, it is not necessary that the affiant's
name appear in the body of the instrument. Dwigans v. State, 222 Ind. 434, 54
N.E.2d 100 (1944).
50. Enwright v. State, 58 Ind. 567 (1877) ; Dukes v. State, 11 Ind. 171 (1858).
51. When the name of the criminal is alleged to be unknown, the defendant
must be identified as the person who committed the crime. Foster v. State, 106
Ind. 272, 6 N.E. 641 (1885). See also IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1126 (Burns 1956),
supra note 43.
52. See app. A.
53. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1127 (Burns 1956), supra note 43. An example of a
motor vehicle violation in which time could conceivably be the essence of the offense
is a violation of the requirement that certain lights be illuminated from one-half
hour after sunset to one-half hour before sunrise. IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2202
(Burns 1959).
54. See app. A.
NOTES
vehicle violations in Indiana, but it is not essential to the allegation of all
such violations. The statute defining the offenses of reckless homicide,
driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs,
and reckless driving; and the statutes outlining the duties of a motorist
after an accident are made applicable upon highways and "elsewhere
throughout the state.""5  If a charge is prepared stating one of the of-
fenses which applies "elsewhere throughout the state," which did not in
fact occur on a public highway, the phrase "upon a public highway" as it
now appears in the uniform complaint may be stricken out and a descrip-
tion of the place of the violation substituted in the blank provided. Fail-
ure to strike out the phrase in such a case, however, would amount to
mere surplusage which could be entirely disregarded since the allegation
with reference to the public highway, if true, would not bar the prosecu-
tion."0 If the surplusage consists of matter which, if true, would con-
stitute a legal justification of the offense charged, or other legal bar to
the prosecution, the charge may be quashed."7 The pre-printing of the
phrase "upon a public highway" on the ticket-complaint therefore, is not
objectionable.
5. THE VENUE.
The word "venue" connotes locality and it normally relates only to
the place where or the territory within which either party may require
the case to be tried."8 The Indiana Constitution and statutes guarantee
to the accused the right to trial in the county in which the offense was
commited, 5 and venue must be shown either in the caption or the body of
the affidavit."0 The uniform complaint states the venue in its caption
and refers to it in its body by the words, "located in the township, county
55. IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-1822 (Burns 1952). In giving his opinion that the
statute prohibiting the driving of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor applied on the streets of an Army Camp located in Indiana unless the territory
had been ceded to the federal government under terms giving it exclusive jurisdiction,
the Attorney General of Indiana said: ". . . it is my opinion that the General Assembly
has ample power to declare that the operation of a vehicle while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor, at any place within the state, is a criminal offense." 1942
OPs. AT'Y GEN. (Ind.) 220. Several states have statutes similar to § 47-1822. In
Sullivan v. State, 213 Miss. 14, 56 So. 2d 93 (1952), and State v. Harold, 74 Ariz.
210, 246 P.2d 178 (1952), the provisions were held to make certain traffic statutes
operative other than on public highways.
56. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1127, supra note 43.
57. Sheets v. State, 217 Ind. 676, 680, 30 N.E.2d 309, 311 (1940).
58. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROMu ARREST TO APPEAL 366-73 (1947).
59. IND. CoNsT. art. 1, § 13; IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-201 (Burns 1956), Bledsoe
v. State, 223 Ind. 675, 64 N.E.2d 160 (1945).
60. Rivers v. State, 144 Ind. 16, 42 N.E. 1021 (1895). In this case the county
was named in the caption and referred to later in the body as "county and state
aforesaid." This was held to be unobjectionable.
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and state aforesaid."'" This would seem to meet the requirements of
the Indiana law.
6. DESCRIPTION OF THE OFFENSE.
One purpose of an affidavit is to inform the defendant of the spe-
cific crime with which he is charged. The affidavit does not have to be
couched in any certain words or phrased in a particular manner so long
as it gives the defendant an opportunity to prepare for his defense.62 For
example, the complaint need not be phrased in the technical language that
prevailed under the common law,6" nor is it necessary that the language
of the statute be strictly pursued if other words conveying the same
meaning are used.6" When the applicable statute specifically states the
acts which constitute the offense, however, the use of the statutory
language in the affidavit is customary. 5 Minor defects in the pleading,
such as incorrect spelling and punctuation, which do not prejudice the
substantial rights of the defendant, are considered immaterial and are not
reversible error.66 The ultimate facts, and not the evidentiary facts, are
the only requirements in charging a criminal offense ;6" and a fact which is
reasonably inferable from the facts pleaded is deemed to have been
averred."
In alleging the offense on the uniform traffic ticket-complaint, the
appropriate pre-printed offense may be checked. If the charge is one not
printed on the face of the ticket, a short description of the violation and
the statute number is written in the blank provided. The conditions
prevailing at the time of the violation are indicated by checking pre-
61. See app. A.
62. McCloskey v. State, 222 Ind. 514, 53 N.E.2d 1021 (1943); Edwards v.
State, 220 Ind. 490, 44 N.E.2d 304 (1942).
63. Agar v. State, 176 Ind. 234, 94 N.E. 819 (1911).
64. Ibid. If a criminal statute provides a definition of an offense and states
specifically what acts constitute it, it will usually suffice to charge the offense in the
language of the statute. Hicks v. State, 197 Ind. 294, 150 N.E. 759 (1925) ; State
v. New, 165 Ind. 571, 76 N.E. 400 (1905). However such a charge was held in-
sufficient in one case because of failure to allege facts showing the evil which the
legislature sought to suppress and in another where the constructive element of
knowledge was not averred. See Weisenberger v. State, 202 Ind. 424, 175 N.E. 238(1931), and Schmidt v. State, 78 Ind. 41 (1881). In each of these cases, although
the charge was written in the language of the statute, the charge was held to be
insufficient.
65. For examples of wording used in affidavits charging motor vehicle offenses,
see 2 EWBANKS, INDIANA CRIMINAL LAW § § 1384, 1385 (1956).
66. Edwards v. State, 220 Ind. 490, 44 N.E.2d 304 (1943); Bader v. State,
176 Ind. 268, 94 N.E. 1009 (1911).
67. Meno v. State, 197 Ind. 16, 164 N.E. 93 (1925).
68. Kelley v. State, 231 Ind. 671, 110 N.E.2d 860 (1952) ; Woodsmall v. State,
179 Ind. 697, 102 N.E. 130 (1911).
69. See app. A.
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printed information.70 Thus, the offense is very briefly alleged, with no
attempt to follow the language of the statute defining the violation. To
justify this type of criminal pleading the proponents of the uniform com-
plaint quote the axiom, "the more severe the penalty, the more technical
need be the pleading," on the theory that because most traffic violations
impose only a misdemeanor penalty, they are sufficiently charged in this
manner.7 1  Another argument proposed is that the simplicity of most
traffic violations allows their complete description to be conveyed by
their title, and that the relatively few traffic offenses which involve
omissive or commissive acts are sufficiently clear to the average person
so that it is not necessary to embellish their component elements with
legal phraseology.7 ' This theory has its limits, however, and there is a
point beyond which the courts are unwilling to go in the brief description
of an offense-even in states which have officially adopted the uniform
ticket-complaintY.7  Perhaps the ultimate of abbreviated criminal plead-
ings is one which was upheld in Oregon, where the violation of disobey-
ing a traffic signal was alleged by "Dis. Sig." 4  Affidavits containing
pre-printed descriptions of traffic offenses are used in Indiana, but the
descriptions closely follow the language of appropriate statutes.75
70. Ibid.
71. Interview with James P. Economos, Director, Traffic Court Program,
American Bar Association, Traffic Court Conference at Indiana University School
of Law, March 11, 1959.
72. WARREN, TRAFFIC COURTS 45 (1942).
73. State v. Henry, 56 N.J. Super. 1, 151 A.2d 412, 416 (1959). Here, the
officer, in completing the complaint copy of the uniform ticket, listed as a descrip-
tion of the offense the statute number, and further down on the ticket the words
".21% of blood alcohol." The court said, "The suggestion that the court determine
whether the complaint adequately informed defendant of the charge against him
by considering his personal knowledge of matters not appearing on the face of the
complaint, is not tenable. To have the court inquire whether, despite the failure of
the complaint to state an offense, defendant actually did know with what he was
charged, would not only run contrary to our rules of practice and basic principles
of criminal procedure, but invite slipshod practice on the part of the police in making
out complaints. It would also have the potential of time-consuming excursions into
the collateral issue of whether a defendant actually knew, apart from the complaint,
the nature of the offense charged. It is not too much to ask the State to provide
in the complaint a succinct but informative description of the motor vehicle offense
laid to defendant."
74. Yunker v. Quillan, 202 Ore. 302, 275 P.2d 240 (1954). It should be noted
that the abbreviation used on the ticket was also listed on its reverse side along
with the meaning of the abbreviation, "disregarded signal." The reverse side of the
ticket also quoted the title of the ordinance, referred to by number on the face
of the ticket. It is also interesting to note that in the case of People v. Scott, 3 N.Y.2d
148, 143 N.E.2d 901 (1957), three of seven justices of that state's highest court,
in dissenting, indicated that the traffic ticket-which had not been designed to
serve as a criminal pleading in the first place--was nevertheless sufficient for
that purpose.
75. The Magistrate Courts of Marion County, Indiana, use pre-printed form
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The Indiana Constitution guarantees to the accused the right to have
each essential element of the crime set out in the pleading."6 This right
enables the defendant to prepare his defense whether the elements are ex-
pressed in statutory terms or whether they enter into the offense by con-
struction.7" Conformity to this Constitutional mandate with the uniform
ticket-complaint, when the offenses of leaving the scene of an accident
or reckless homicide are involved, appears difficult if not impossible.
There are Indiana cases holding that in some instances the language of
the statute itself must be expanded in the affidavit to include the par-
ticular circumstances involved in these violations." Even the Legisla-
ture cannot dispense with such allegations in a criminal pleading as are
reasonably necessary to describe the offense.7 1 If, however, a defendant
freely and understandingly pleads guilty to a charge which is insuf-
ficiently alleged in an affidavit, he has waived his right to have each ele-
ment alleged and he cannot subsequently raise this objection on appeal."0
How may a defendant raise the issue of the sufficiency of the uni-
form ticket-complaint or any affidavit in the trial court? Motions to
require the state to make an affidavit more specific are not recognized in
the criminal procedure of Indiana."1 The proper method for the defend-
ant to test the sufficiency of the affidavit in the trial court is, by a mo-
tion to quash,82 which performs the same function in a criminal case that
a demurrer performs in a civil case. 3 A motion to quash may be made
only before the defendant pleads, or after his plea is withdrawn." If the
affidavit does not state a public offense, or if it states an offense with
insufficient certainty, it is subject to a motion to quash. 5 The defendant
affidavits which follow, almost verbatim, the statutory language for each motor
vehicle offense.
76. IND. CONST. art. 1, § 13, McNamara v. State, 203 Ind. 596, 181, N.E.
512 (1932).
77. McCormick v. State, 233 Ind. 281, 119, N.E.2d 5 (1953); Borton v. State,
230 Ind. 679, 106 N.E.2d 392 (1952).
78. Kelley v. State, 233 Ind. 294, 119 N.E.2d 322 (1953); Rogers v. State,
227 Ind. 709, 88 N.E.2d 755 (1949).
79. Hinshaw v. State, 188 Ind. 147, 122 N.E. 418 (1918).
80. Such an assignment of error will not reach mere uncertainty or a defective
statement of facts, or a failure to observe technical formalities which could have
been corrected in the trial court before trial if the court's attention had been
called thereto. Brown v.. State, 219 Ind. 251, 37 N.E.2d 73 (1941).
81. Hinshaw v. State, 188 Ind. 147, 122 N.E. 418 (1918).
82. Affidavits charging the violation in the language of the statute are held
sufficient to withstand a motion to quash. Shade v. State, 196 Ind. 665, 149 N.E.
348 (1925). IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1129 (Burns 1956), Lander v. State, 238 Ind.
680, 154 N.E.2d 507 (1958).
83. State v. Taylor, 235 Ind. 632, 137 N.E.2d 537 (1956).
84. Laycock v. State, 136 Ind. 217, 36 N.E. 137 (1893).
85. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1129 (Bums 1956), Lander v. State, 238 Ind. 680,
154 N.E.2d 507 (1958).
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is not automatically discharged if the motion to quash is sustained; the
prosecution may ask leave to amend or file a new affidavit."0 After the
defendant pleads, the affidavit may be amended only as to matters of
form and not as to matters of substance.87 Substance is that which is
essential to the making of a valid charge of crime.8" To validly charge a
crime, each element of the offense should be alleged."0 One serious dif-
ficulty with the uniform traffic ticket-complaint concerns the possibility
of amendment of the complaint. The courts may not allow a uniform
traffic ticket-complaint which only states the name of the offense, the
statute number, and the conditions prevailing at the time of the offense
to be amended by substituting in its place, after the defendant pleads, an
affidavit written substantially in the language of the statute and alleging
each element of the offense. If the prosecution wishes to move for dis-
missal for purposes of re-filing a sufficient complaint, it must so move
before jeopardy attaches because this action after jeopardy has attached
will acquit the defendant."0
Another pleading available to a criminal defendant is a plea in abate-
ment which attacks errors not apparent on the face of the affidavit."
The defendant may also move in arrest of judgment after a plea or a
finding of guilty if the offense was not committed within the jurisdic-
tion of the court or if the facts stated in the affidavit do not constitute a
public offense. 2 A motion made upon the latter ground, and sustained
by the court, would not seem to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense because there having been no public offense charged, the de-
fendant has not been in prior jeopardy.93
86. IND. ANN. STAT. § § 9-1130, 9-1131. The legislative intent expressed in
Secs. 9-1130 and 9-1131, Burns' supra, is that if indictment be quashed it is duty of
court to direct resubmission to grand jury but if charge is by affidavit, a refiling
by state is discretionary with the prosecutor rather than mandatory and does not
authorize the court to direct the filing of an amended affidavit within a specified
time and only provides for discharge by the court under the circumstances that the
objection raised in the motion to quash cannot be avoided by a new indictment or
affidavit. State v. Taylor, 235 Ind. 632, 137 N.E.2d 537 (1956).
87. Gardner v. State, 229 Ind. 368, 97 N.E.2d 921 (1950).
88. Souerdike v. State, 230 Ind. 192, 102 N.E.2d 367 (1951).
89. McCormick v. State, 233 Ind. 281, 119 N.E.2d 5 (1953).
90. Joy v. State, 14 Ind. 139 (1860). Jeopardy does not attach until the first
step in the trial is taken. Halloran v. State, 80 Ind. 586 (1881).
91. Stevens v. State, 230 Ind. 518, 105 N.E.2d 332 (1952).
92. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2001 (Burns 1956), West v. State, 228 Ind. 431, 92
N.E.2d 852 (1950).
93. "The imperative necessity of having an indictment which states an offense
as well as the hardship from the point of view of the defendant where it is thus
deficient is shown by the prevalent view that, where the defendant has been con-
victed in such a case, he can be tried again and cannot plead former jeopardy. Trial
under a void accusation is regarded as no trial at all." ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
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From this short review of pleadings by the accused, it is obvious
that the prosecution can avoid much delay by filing an initial pleading
which is sufficient to withstand all resisting motions. As we have seen,
under the strict requirements of Indiana criminal pleading, the uniform
ticket-complaint is insufficient in this respect for some motor vehicle
violations.
7. CONcLusIoN.
The traditional conclusion of a criminal charge in Indiana is the
phrase, "contrary to the form of statute in such cases made and pro-
vided, and against the peace and dignity of the state of Indiana."" Af-
fidavits continue to bear the conclusion as a carry-over from the common
law although its omission is declared by statute to be an immaterial de-
fect.95 Therefore the conclusion used in the uniform ticket-complaint is
sufficient under the Indiana law.
8. SIGNATURE OF COMPLAINANT.
There is some Indiana authority that in the absence of a statutory
requirement or rule, an affidavit need not be signed by the affiant, but it
must be supported by oath or affirmation." If duly sworn to, it is not
material that the affiant signs other than his true name ;" and if properly
subscribed at the bottom it is not necessary that the affiant's name appear
in the body of the instrument.9" The uniform ticket-complaint provides
a blank for the signature of the police officer issuing the ticket, who is
also the affiant in most cases. 9
9. VERIFICATION.
Among the officials authorized to take affidavits in Indiana are
judges,' court clerks,' mayors, 112 justices of the peace,0 3 magistrates,'
FROm ARREST TO APPEAL 208 (1947). The state is provided an appeal. IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 9-2304 and 9-2305 (Burns 1956).
94. EWBANKS, INDIANA CRIMINAL LAW § 168 (1956).
95. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1127 (Burns 1956).
96. Cantwell v. State, 27 Ind. 505 (1867).
97. "The object of the law is accomplished when an affidavit is actually made
by a real person, and the name used is not material provided it is one by which the
affiant is commonly known or is a name which supplies the means of identifying
him." State v. Cooper, 96 Ind. 331, 333 (1884).
98. Dwigans v. State, 222 Ind. 436, 54 N.E.2d 100 (1943); Beller v. State,
90 Ind. 448 (1883).
99. See app. A.
100. IND. ANN. STAT. § 49-601 (Burns Supp. 1959).
101. IND. ANN. STAT. § 49-601 (Burns Supp. 1959), Craig v. State, 232 Ind.
294, 112 N.E.2d 296 (1953).
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notaries public0 5 and prosecuting attorneys."' The purpose of the jurat
is to certify that the affidavit was duly sworn to before an officer
authorized to administer oaths.' The uniform ticket-complaint bears
the words, "sworn to and subscribed before me," followed by the date,
the signature of the judge or clerk, and his title.' s This meets the Indi-
ana requirements.
In certain cases, an element in addition to the nine listed above must
be included in an affidavit under the Indiana law. This element is the
written approval of the prosecuting attorney. Prior to a revision in the
Indiana criminal code in 1905, an information filed by the prosecuting
attorney was a form of criminal pleading in the circuit and criminal
courts, but an information was not required before a justice of the
peace."'c Today the affidavit performs the function of the pre-1905
information and when filed in a justice or city court charging a mis-
demeanor it does not require the approval of the prosecuting attorney,"0
nor is such approval required in the magistrate courts if the affidavit is
signed and sworn to by certain peace officers."' On the other hand,
when a felony is'12 charged in a court having only jurisdiction to conduct
a preliminary hearing, the affidavit charging the offense must bear the
indorsement, "approved by me," and the signature of the prosecuting
attorney, as must all affidavits which are filed in the circuit and criminal
102. IND. ANN. STAT. § 49-601 (Burns Supp. 1959).
103. IND. ANN. STAT. § 5-207 (Burns 1946).
104. IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-3806 (Burns 1946).
105. IND. ANN. STAT. § 49-3506 (Burns 1951), Miller v. State, 122 Ind. 355,
24 N.E. 156 (1889).
106. IND. ANN. STAT. § 49-2506 (Burns 1951), Roberts v. State, 190 Ind.
232, 130 N.E. 125 (1921).
107. Craig v. State, 232 Ind. 293, 112 N.E.2d 296 (1953).
108. See app. A.
109. Lynn v. State, 207 Ind. 393, 193 N.E. 380 (1934); Parish v. State, 194
Ind. 44, 141 N.E. 786 (1923).
110. Parish v. State, 194 Ind. 44, 141 N.E. 786 (1923).
111. "...The affidavit shall be approved by the prosecuting attorney, except
that if it is signed and sworn to by a sheriff, a deputy sheriff on regular duty,
a city police officer, a state police officer or a town marshal, it does not need
to be approved by the prosecuting attorney..." IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-3806 (Burns 1946).
112. The traffic offenses of reckless homicide and second and subsequent offenses
of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs may
be prosecuted as felonies. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2001 (Burns 1952). A felony
is defined in Indiana as a crime which may be punished with death or imprisonment
in the state prison. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-101 (Burns 1956). In Kelley v. State,
233 Ind. 294, 119 N.E.2d 322 (1953), the offense of leaving the scene of an accident
was treated by the trial court as a felony. On appeal, the conviction was reversed
because of the trial court's failure to sustain a motion in arrest of judgment attack-
ing the affidavit. The Supreme Court of Indiana made no reference to the offense
as either a felony or a misdemeanor, but instead referred to it as a "criminal offense."
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courts.11 The omission of the prosecutor's approval, when such approval
is required, is fatal to the affidavit on a motion to quash.114
CONCLUSIONS
This review of the five most important functions of the uniform
traffic ticket and complaint leads to the following conclusions:
1. The uniform traffic ticket in its present form is adequate under
Indiana law as a notice to appear because the only statutory requirement
of a notice to appear is that the arrested person's name and address, ve-
hicle license number, the offense charged, and the time and place of court
appearance be prepared in duplicate by the arresting officer.
2. The uniform traffic ticket is also a sufficient arrest record for
the police because the content of police traffic arrests records is not pro-
vided by statute but is determined administratively by each department.
The uniform ticket compares favorably with arrest tickets traditionally
used.
3. As a court docket the ticket should be used only to supplement
the court docket presently kept. The many and varied requirements for
dockets of the seven courts having jurisdiction over traffic violations
would indicate that it would probably be impractical to attempt to re-
design the uniform ticket-docket so that it would suffice as a docket in
all of these courts.
4. The statutory requirement that the abstract of conviction form
shall be furnished by the bureau of motor vehicles cannot be fulfilled by
the use of the uniform ticket-abstract so long as each police department
continues to furnish its own uniform tickets. It would seem that if the
uniform traffic ticket is to be truly uniform both in its application and
administration that all tickets should be furnished to the police by one
central agency, such as the bureau of motor vehicles.
5. The proposition that the uniform traffic ticket in its present
form is a sufficient affidavit under Indiana case law for all violations of
the traffic code is untenable.
The one apparent weakness of the uniform traffic ticket as tested by
the Indiana law is that in certain of the more complex traffic violations
it is insufficient as an affidavit because it does not describe the offense
in sufficient detail. It seems entirely reasonable that a simple traffic
violation such as "disregarding a stop sign" could be described with suf-
ficient certainty to apprise the defendant of the crime with which he is
113. Parish v. State, 194 Ind. 44, 141 N.E. 786 (1923); IND. ANN. STAT. § §
9-908 and 9-909 (Burns 1956).
114. Trisler v. State, 233 Ind. 479, 120 N.E.2d 404 (1954).
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charged by merely naming the offense in the affidavit. By the same
standard, however, probably only those motorists trained in the elusive
definitions of the law, and possibly not those, could be adequately ap-
prised of a relatively complex charge such as reckless driving by the
name of the offense only.
Major revision of the affidavit copy of the uniform traffic ticket is
one possible answer to the anticipated problem of its survival under the
present requirements of the Indiana law." 5 The proponents of the ticket,
however, urge that no such drastic revisions be made." 6  From a practi-
cal standpoint, if it is necessary to completely re-design the body of the
affidavit copy of the ticket so that it conforms to the requirements of
affidavits presently used, it would seem that little would be accomplished
from the use of the ticket as a criminal pleading in the first instance.
Fitting the uniform ticket as an affidavit into the criminal pro-
cedure of Indiana is comparable to fitting the proverbial square peg into
a round hole. This statement is supported by the actual record of accep-
tance of the ticket as an affidavit by the Indiana courts. The prosecutor
files the uniform ticket-complaint in only three of the ninety-two circuit
courts." In the justice of the peace courts, where the prosecutor need
not approve affidavits for misdemeanor charges, the record of acceptance
is different, as would be anticipated. There are approximately three-
hundred justices of the peace in Indiana who regularly hear traffic
cases."' Of these, all but twenty-nine accept the uniform ticket-complaint
as a criminal pleading."9  Twenty-two of the twenty-nine who refuse to
recognize the ticket as an affidavit do so upon the advice of the prosecut-
ing attorney. 2 ' The record of acceptance of the ticket-complaint by the
justices of the peace serves as a somewhat unreliable indication of the
115. See WARREN, TRAFFIC COURTS 249 (1942). This type of ticket-complaint,
recommended by Warren in his book nearly twenty years ago, would leave the body
of the ticket-complaint blank, to be filled in with the appropriate description of the
offense by typing or writing it in the space provided. This method would seem to
have the flexibility of allowing a very brief description in those cases where nothing
more is required by the courts and yet it would allow an expanded description of
the offense if required by the courts in more serious cases.
116. EcoNoMos, UNIFORMk TRAFFIC TICKET AND COMPLAINT AND MODEL RuLES
GOVERNING PROCEDURE IN TRAFFIC CASES 2, 3 (1958), supra note 1. The "second
essential or uniformity," (he pre-printing of the six moving traffic violations and
the conditions which increase the seriousness of these violations), is strongly re-
commended. To quote from this pamphlet, "Any deviation from the use of the
above ground rules is a step away from uniformity."
117. This information is based on a survey conducted by personnel of the





legal sufficiency of the instrument because only fourteen of the approxi-
mately three-hundred justices are attorneys.' 2'
About one half of Indiana's city courts accept the uniform ticket as
an affidavit while the other half insist on the use of the traditional affi-
dav't form."' Marion County's four magistrate courts, the only magis-
trate courts presently existing under an enabling statute which allows ap-
pointment of magistrates in any county whose population exceeds forty
thousand, hear an approximate total of 6,900 traffic cases per year.'22
These fcur magistrates, all attorneys, do not accept the uniform ticket as
an affidavit, but instead use a pre-printed form of affidavit which sub-
stantially follows the language of the appropriate statute in motor ve-
hicle cases. The pattern which emerges from this survey is that judges
who are formally schooled in the requirements of the Indiana law show
an extreme reluctance to accept the uniform traffic ticket as an affidavit,
while thcse lacking the benefit of legal training show the opposite
tendency.
This examination of the use of the uniform traffic ticket in Indiana
po'nts to a larger problem of which the uniform ticket is only a part.
The criminal procedure of Indiana, while adequate to meet the needs of
more serious criminal prosecutions is perhaps too unyielding to provide
a realistic approach to the problems of traffic law enforcement. This
problem seemingly exists in the neighboring state of Ohio also where an
exasperated jurist, in referring to a traffic citation, called it a "practical
necessity unrecognized by the antediluvian code of criminal procedure
under which this state cperates.""' 4 Another Ohio judge who has heard
over 30,000 traffic cases has indicated that it is fundamental that traffic
cases be handled under a separate docket from criminal cases. 2 ' This
judge als: maintains that it is essential that all traffic courts follow the
same, uniform procedure if the traffic courts as a whole are to accom-
plish their mission.Y One of the primary functions of the uniform
traffic ticket, of course, is to provide the vehicle for a special and uni-
form procedure of handling traffic cases.
The uniform traffic ticket is not a new, flash-in-the-pan type of ap-
proach to the traffic problem. It has been used with success in the east
121. Ibid.
122. Ibid.
123. This is an estimated figure obtained from the clerks of the four courts.
124. State v. Wheeler, 80 Abs 114, 157 N.E.2d 763 (1958).




for over a decade.' 27 It is submitted that its introduction into the traffic
courts' procedure in Indiana is an encouraging sign indicating the recog-
nition that traffic cases are sufficiently specialized to warrant special
treatment. This trend, plus the undeniable fact that more of our citizens
get their only glimpse of the judicial processes in traffic court than in any
other court, would seem to justify a recommendation that the criminal
procedure should be altered when necessary to accommodate these special
procedural problems. It has been suggested that a rule of the Supreme
Court of Indiana allowing a motion to make more specific in any traffic
case in which the uniform traffic ticket is used as a criminal pleading
would do much to overcome the objections to the ticket when so used."'
Ideally, the supreme court should adopt those model rules governing pro-
cedure in traffic cases 121 which it deems advisable to facilitate the work
of the traffic courts after an exhaustive study is made of the problems
incidental to the official adoption of the uniform traffic ticket."" It is
127. The New Jersey experience is summarized in an address by William J.
Prennan, Jr., , ssociate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, before the Law
,-nd th Layman Conference, '-merican Bar Association, August 25, 1959, at Miami
Pwach, Florida.
128. Interview with Cleon H. Foust, Professor of Law, Indiana University
School of Law, August 16, 1960.
129. Eccxomos, op. c;t. supra note 113, at 7.
l'0. Indiana has the statutory framework for such a study. IND. ANN. STAT. §
9-3705 (Burns 1946) outlines the duties of the Judicial Council:
"It shall be the duty of the council:
(a) To continuously survey and study the operation of the judicial department
o the state, the volume and condition of business in the courts, whether of record
i r not, the methods of procedure therein, the work accomplished, and the character
if the results.
(b) To receive and consider suggestions from judges, public officers, members
of the bar, and others as to remedies for faults in the administration of justice;
(c) To '!evis ways of simplifying judicial procedure, expediting the transaction
of judicial I zs~n's, aid correcting faults in the administration of justice;
(d) 'Jo -u )xit from ima to time to the courts, the judges, or any other officer
4,r department, ekhcr upon the request of any such court, judge, officer or department,
6r upon the council s own motion, such suggestion or recommendation as it may deem
advi JL. for c _anges in rules, procedure or methods of administration, or upon any
o,-thr mattcr pr ainin to the judicial system;
(e) To report annualiy, on or before December 1 of each year, to the governor
and to the Sup, eme Court on the condition of business in the courts, with the
council's recommendations as to needed changes in the organization of the judicial
departiment or the courts, or in judicial procedure. Such reports shall be public
re'or,ls and copies thereof shall be filed with the clerk of the Supreme Court and
iiith the legislati~e rejerence bureau and shall be accessible to the bar and to the
public generally.
(fl To collect, compile, analyze and publish statistics and other information
pcrtaininl to the judicial system." To accomplish these noble purposes, the Judicial
Cincil is appropriated the sum "not to exceed twenty-five hundred dollars ($2500)
annually." IND. A'.'x. STAT. § 9-3708 (Burns 1946). Reference the rule making power
of the ;rpi'eme Court of Indiana, see IND. ANx. STAT. § 4-109 (Burns 1946), Epstein
v. St'-Lt, 190 Ind. 693, 127 N.E. 441 (1921).
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evident that until the supreme court or the legislative branch of our state
government speaks out on the subject of the uniform traffic ticket as a
criminal pleading, the status of the ticket will continue to be a matter of
conjecture, and the traffic law violators of Indiana-the most represen-
tative cross-section of our citizenry to appear before our courts-will
continue to be deprived of the uniformity of treatment which they de-
serve under our judicial system.
Appendix A reprinted with the permission of Ron E. Weger,
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